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Abstract
In the era of 9/11, terrorist attacks occur with sufficient frequency and lethality to constitute a realistic threat to the
well-being of the American public. Sensing this concern, politicians emphasize the threat of violent attacks to advance a
platform of making public safety a priority. In this context, the authors assess the extent, sources, and emotional impact
of the public’s concern about terrorism. On the basis of a national survey of 1,000 Americans, the authors examine
levels of fear of a terrorist attack and worry about terrorism relative to other potential harms. They also determine
whether concern about terrorism translates into support for homeland security measures that target Muslims. Of the
predictors in the authors’ models, gender, religiosity, and psychological distress were most consistently associated with
fear of terrorism and worry about being a victim of a terrorist attack. Structural equation modeling demonstrated that
terrorism-related fear and worry predict support for anti-Muslim policies.
Keywords
fear, worry, anti-Muslim policies, Trump administration, concerns about terrorism

Recent national polls suggest that since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, Americans have continued to fear terrorism. A 2017 Gallup poll reported that 60 percent of Americans
feel that it is very or somewhat likely that a terrorist attack
will occur in the United States in the near future; this percentage is up from 38 percent in 2011. The same poll found that
38 percent of Americans are less willing to attend large events
and 46 percent are less willing to travel overseas because of
concerns related to terrorism, whereas 42 percent are very or
somewhat worried that they or a family member will be a
victim of a terrorist attack. Furthermore, a national survey by
the Pew Research Center disclosed that Americans ranked
addressing terrorism concerns as the top priority for President
Trump and Congress in 2018, outranking issues including the
economy, health care costs, social security, and the environment. Despite estimates that the actual likelihood of a person
living in the United States dying in a terrorist attack over the
course of his or her lifetime is 1 in 75,000 (Mueller 2009),
Americans are clearly concerned about national security and
the potential for terrorist attacks within the United States.
Indeed, politicians have succeeded in harnessing the fear
of Americans. As Joel Best (2018) detailed in his recent book,
Americans have a long history of obsessions with threatening

“American nightmares,” and targeted rhetoric has been used
to convince people that they should be afraid. Notably, Donald
Trump’s presidential campaign focused heavily on threats
facing Americans and, in particular, threats related to terrorism (Altheide 2017; Best 2018). President Trump’s executive
order 13769, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States,” commonly referred to as “the
Muslim ban,” serves as an example of a measure that captures
Americans’ fears about a selected group of people with the
stated intent of limiting the threat of terrorism.
Yet as Best (2018) explained, some audiences are more
receptive to such messages than others, varying by factors
such as race, gender, class, and ideology. Thus, it is necessary
to examine Americans’ concerns in context, by comparing
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2
levels of concern from different sources of threat and determining whether some Americans are more concerned than
others. The aim of the present study is to understand
Americans’ concern about terrorism by placing it in context
among other issues and examining the utility of theoretically
driven models for understanding this reaction. More specifically, we draw on the fear of crime, sociology of emotions,
and culture of fear literatures to assess predictors of concern
about terrorism on the basis of structural vulnerability, cultural orientation, emotional vulnerability, political partisanship, and instrumental factors. We then examine whether
concern about terrorism translates into support for policy
measures that target Muslims in particular.
Our analyses are based on data from a national probability
survey of 1,000 Americans conducted in 2018. We designed
the survey to measure concern about terrorism in two ways:
fear and worry. First, the respondents were asked how afraid
they were of terrorism relative to other harmful events in
society. Second, they were asked how much they worry
about terrorism compared with other day-to-day personal
troubles. Previous literature has tended to treat items measuring fear and worry as equivalent, grouping them under the
concept of fear (e.g., Alper and Chappell 2012; Andersen and
Mayerl 2018; Franklin, Franklin, and Fearn 2008; Gray,
Jackson, and Farrall 2008; Jackson 2005; Nellis and Savage
2012; Rader 2004). Other researchers, however, have argued
that fear and worry are distinct emotions that should be
treated as separate constructs (e.g., Ferraro and LaGrange
1987; Lupton 2000; Warr and Stafford 1983; Williams,
McShane, and Akers 2000). Thus, fear is generally described
as an emotion that is reactive and not based on sustained
deliberation, whereas worry is seen as an emotion that
involves individuals ruminating about issues that bother
them (e.g., Garofalo 1981; Jackson and Gouseti 2014;
Kemper 1987). We have maintained this distinction in our
study so as to tap into fear and worry as separate, yet related
emotions; we group them under the global construct of “concern” about terrorism. Thus, this study has two goals: (1) to
examine levels and sources of fear and worry about terrorism
and (2) to determine whether fear and worry each predict
anti-Muslim policies.
The rapidly growing field of terrorism and homeland security has produced insights regarding the nature of terrorism
(e.g., extent, global spread, methods, harm) and on measures
aimed at controlling its origins, spread, and impact (Haner
2017). By contrast, the scholarly literature on fear of terrorism is limited and tends to reference general public opinion
polls (e.g., Chapman University 2016; Gallup 2016) or
explore sources of fear, such as governments or political parties (e.g., McGill 2016). The present study integrates the academic research on terrorism with theory concerning the
experience and antecedents of concern (e.g., Bericat 2016;
Glassner 1999; Stearns 2010; Tudor 2003; Walsh 2017) to
examine Americans’ emotional responses to terrorism and
their outcomes. Notably, elected officials often cite Americans’
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worries to justify a range of policies, including banning citizens from Muslim nations and expanding the national security powers of the federal government. Thus, there is a need
for systematic research that measures the extent of concern
about terrorism versus other threats to public safety, possible
sources of variation in emotional responses, and the extent to
which these concerns are (or are not) related to homeland
security proposals. In the following section, we review the
literature in this area and hypothesized predictors of concern
about terrorism.

Concerns about Terrorism in Context
Again, much literature on terrorism centers on the fear component. Fear is considered a primary emotion, that is, a universal emotion that has fitness-enhancing properties (e.g.,
fight or flight) and constitutes the foundation from which all
other, more complex emotions are formed (Izard 1977;
Kemper 1987; Turner 2000). The experience of fear signals
danger to individuals and encourages them to evaluate their
options for behavior in ways that protect their interests
(Barbalet 1998; Clay-Warner 2014). In his power-status theory of emotions, Kemper (1978, 1987) argued that individuals experience fear when they feel that they have insufficient
power, either because of a loss of power or not receiving
power that is expected. Thus, the sense of powerlessness or
vulnerability associated with the potential for a terrorist
attack may instill fear (Barbalet 1998).
Although fear is a universal experience, the sources,
extent, and expression of fear are shaped by culture and vary
over time (e.g., Furedi 2018; Glassner 1999; Stearns 2006).
For example, historian Peter Stearns (2006) noted a shift in
American society in which Americans were no longer
encouraged to master their fears but instead have become
socialized to avoid them. Public attention to potential threats
to American society has resulted in emotional overreaction
and, notably, excessive fear. Scholars who have examined
the American culture of fear point to the role of mass media
in arousing and manipulating the fears of the public (Altheide
2017; Best 2018; Glassner 1999; Stearns, 2006, 2010). The
“media-ization of emotion” can be seen in the deliberate use
of fear-based reporting, where even weather reports seek to
create fear (Stearns 2010). In regard to fear of terrorism,
Altheide (2017) argued that the American media operate on
the “politics of fear,” whereby fear creates entertainment
value, generates profits, and controls audiences. Fear is thus
socially constructed, and according to Altheide, the topic of
terrorism is sufficiently threatening to create extensive fear
in audiences.
Therefore, in our effort to understand concern about terrorism, it is important that we both place it in a context
among other concerns and attend to current events. For
example, on the basis of public opinion polls (e.g., Pew
Research Center 2013; Reinhart 2017), we expect terrorism
to rank highly among Americans’ concerns, although other
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salient issues may rank higher depending on media coverage
at the time of the data collection. Notably, we fielded the
survey in mid-July 2018. At that time, the media focused
heavily on the Trump administration’s “zero-tolerance”
immigration policy, which led to thousands of children being
separated from their families and detained in ill-equipped
facilities operated by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services upon crossing the U.S.-Mexico border (e.g.,
Barry et al. 2018). Thus, we expect that immigration was a
particularly concerning issue at the time of the survey. With
this context in mind, we explore the salience of terrorism as
a fearful and worrisome topic among the American public
and subsequently analyze potential antecedents of concern
about terrorism. Given that much research focuses on fear,
the hypotheses for the present study are drawn from the fear
of terrorism literature and are assumed to apply to worry
about terrorism. Again, this assumption is tested by examining whether the predictors are the same for both components
of concern. Thus, this study examines the following seven
hypotheses.

Predicting Concern about Terrorism
Empirical analyses of predictors of concern about terrorism
are limited. Most examinations have focused on the role of
mass media in generating fear and worry about terrorism
(e.g., Altheide 2017; Nellis and Savage 2012). One notable
exception is a recent study by Andersen and Mayerl (2018),
who examined predictors of worry about terrorism on the
basis of the fear of crime literature as well as attitudes toward
Muslims using data from a sample of residents of
Kaiserslautern, Germany. To our knowledge, similar research
has not been conducted with U.S. samples. Thus, as a starting
point, we draw on the fear of crime literature, and the vulnerability perspective in particular, to develop fear of terrorism
prediction models. Additionally, we test models based on
findings from the mass communications literature and public
opinion polling that highlight the role of cultural and political factors in shaping terrorism-related concerns (Cox and
Jones 2015; Das et al. 2009; Jacobs, Boukes, and Vliegenthart
2018; Mueller 2009; Smeltz 2015). We also assess the influence of emotional vulnerability and political media exposure
on concern about terrorism (Andersen and Mayerl 2018;
Ellis and Renouf 2018).
First, according to the vulnerability perspective, fear of
crime is greater among individuals who, by their personal
characteristics, are believed to be more susceptible to victimization compared with others (Lane et al. 2014; Wyant 2008).
In the fear of crime literature, women and the elderly have
been found to be consistently more fearful of crime, even
when their objective risks may be relatively low (Hale 1996;
Henson and Reyns 2015; Lane et al. 2014; Warr 1984, 2000).
Research suggests that women’s greater fear of crime is due
largely to fear of sexual assault (Ferraro 1995; Fisher and
Sloan 2003) or physical assault more generally (Hirtenlehner
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and Farrall 2014). Furthermore, through differential socialization, women tend to feel and express negative, powerless
emotions such as fear more than men (Brody 1999;
Hochschild 1981; Hollander 2001; Sutton and Farrall 2005).
On the basis of the vulnerability perspective as well as gender differences in emotional socialization, we predict the
following:
Hypothesis 1: Women will report greater concern about
terrorism than men.
Hypothesis 2: Older Americans will report greater concern about terrorism than younger Americans.
Second, we examine the role of culture in shaping fear of
terrorism. The sociology of emotions literature has recognized
the influence of emotion cultures in shaping the antecedents,
experiences, and expressions of emotion (e.g., Gordon 1989;
Thoits 1989). Here, we consider cultural orientation to consist
of beliefs that might differentiate respondents in their experiences of terrorism-related fear. As we focus our study in the
United States, the key cultural factor that we examine is
strength of Christian religiosity (Marfouk forthcoming).
Empirical research has shown a positive correlation between
religiosity and expression of terrorism concerns (Adamczyk
and LaFree 2015). Furthermore, strength of group identification increases fear of the out-group (Bloom, Arikan, and
Courtemanche 2015; Mackie, Silver, and Smith 2004). This
may be particularly true for persons with strong Christian religious identities because research suggests that the media has
encouraged a culture of fear of Islam in which Muslims are
working against “Christian America” (Powell 2018). On the
basis of this cultural argument, we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Strength of Christian religiosity will be
positively associated with concern about terrorism.
Third, in addition to structural and cultural factors, emotional vulnerability may also relate to the extent of fear experiences. Ferraro and LaGrange (1987) noted that higher
levels of fear of crime may be due to a tendency to be more
fearful in general (also see Ellis and Renouf 2018). Within
the sociology of mental health literature, psychological distress is frequently analyzed as an indicator of emotional vulnerability that varies by social statuses and environmental
conditions (e.g., Mirowsky and Ross 2003). Indeed, in a
large survey of Los Angeles residents, Eisenman et al. (2009)
found that persons with severe psychological distress
expressed greater terrorism-related fear and avoidance
behaviors. Thus, we predict:
Hypothesis 4: Psychological distress will be positively
associated with concern about terrorism.
Fourth, national public opinion polls consistently show patterns in fear of terrorism by political ideology. In particular,
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conservatives express greater concern, anger, and worry about
terrorism compared with liberals (Reinhart 2017; Sury,
Schlegelmilch, and Redlener 2016). Furthermore, Altheide
(2002, 2017) argued that conservative political agendas have
generated a fear of crime and of terrorism in particular (also
see Stearns 2006). As Best (2018) observed,
Donald Trump’s successful presidential campaign relied heavily
on rhetoric about threats menacing America—and other
politicians’ failure to address them. These fears resonated with
some voters . . . people find it easy to congregate among and
listen to those who share their views—and their worries.
(pp. 187–88)

With the current conservative administration, we expect that
terrorism-related fear messages will resonate more with likeminded individuals.
Hypothesis 5: Political conservatives will report greater
concern about terrorism than nonconservatives.
Finally, we examine the role of the media in shaping perspectives on the threat of terrorism. As Altheide (2017)
argued, the media aim to generate fear among audiences,
particularly when it concerns the threat of crime or major
violent events by outsiders (see Rumbaut and Ewing 2007;
Stearns 2010). Empirical research has also found that terrorism-related news consumption strengthens anti-Muslim attitudes and fears about terrorism (Jacobs, Boukes, and
Vliegenthart 2018; Nellis and Savage 2012; Ogan et al.
2014). We predict the following:
Hypothesis 6: Greater interest in the news will be positively associated with concern about terrorism.

Concern about Terrorism and Anti-Muslim Policy
Support
Several scholars have identified increasing levels of fear
among the American public and have connected these fear
responses to the proliferation of emotionally laden news
media and political campaigns (e.g., Best 2018; Furedi 2018;
Glassner 1999; Stearns 2006, 2010). With a focus on terrorism in particular, Altheide (2017) argued that
tying terrorism coverage to an expansive discourse of fear has
contributed to the emergence of the politics of fear, or decision
makers’ promotion and use of audience beliefs and assumptions
about danger, risk, and fear in order to achieve certain goals.
(p. 133)

Politicians draw on the public’s fear to argue for emotionally
charged policy measures, such as policies that target specific
religious and immigrant groups (Best 2018; Norris, Kern,
and Just 2003).

Empirical studies have shown that general media coverage that portrays Muslims as terrorists or extremists creates
fear and worry about terrorism among the public and generates out-group prejudices (e.g., Das et al. 2009; Kishi 2017;
Nellis and Savage 2012; Powell 2018). Furthermore, perceived threat from outsiders, such as Muslims, has been
linked to fear, and such fear can serve as justification for
prejudiced national security policy measures (Cottrell and
Neuberg 2005; Dunwoody and McFarland 2018). For
instance, fear of terrorism has been used by politicians to
suggest terrorism prevention policies that specifically harm
Muslims, such as banning all Muslim immigration and shutting down mosques (Dunwoody and McFarland 2018;
Saleem et al. 2015). Therefore, in addition to identifying the
antecedents of fear of terrorism, we also examine whether
terrorism-related fear translates into support for national
security policies that single out Muslims as a threatening
group. Such policies are consistent with the Trump administration’s “Muslim ban” approach to terrorism prevention.
To our knowledge, no empirical studies have assessed the
direct relationship between concern about terrorism and
anti-Muslim policy support using nationally representative
data. Several studies (mostly from Europe), however, have
examined how the occurrence of major events (e.g., terrorist
acts) influences attitudes toward Muslims and immigration
more generally. Some of these investigations showed no
association between terrorist events and attitudes toward
immigrants (e.g., Finseraas and Listhaug 2013; Finseraas,
Jakobsson, and Kotsadam 2011; Smiley, Emerson, and
Markussen 2017). By contrast, on the basis of comparisons
of survey data collected before and after major catastrophic
events, other studies reported that terror attacks perceived to
be carried out in the name of Islam have evoked fear and
anxiety toward Muslims and fostered the perception of
immigrants as threatening to Western societies (see Allen
and Nielsen 2002; Finseraas and Listhaug 2013; Hopkins
2010; Legewie 2013; Spilerman and Stecklov 2009). More
specifically, Hopkins (2010) found that the American public
expressed more negative attitudes about Muslim immigration after the 9/11 attacks compared with a year before the
attacks. Likewise, Czymara and Schmidt-Catran’s (2017)
results revealed that the German public’s acceptance of
immigrants (mainly Middle Eastern and African) significantly decreased between April 2015 and January 2016,
mostly because of the mass sexual assaults allegedly committed by men of Arab or North African appearance during
the 2016 New Year’s Eve celebration. Similarly, Legewie’s
(2013) findings indicated that the level of anti-immigrant
attitudes in Spain increased after the 2004 Madrid train
bombings. Thus, presumably, exposure to terrorist attacks
heightens concern about terrorism, which may then relate to
attitudes toward immigrants.
Furthermore, studies have linked fear of crime more generally to concerns about immigrants. For example, Smiley
et al. (2017) found that Copenhagen residents with greater
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fear of crime had stronger reactions to immigration and
opposed to citizenship for immigrants. Similarly, in an analysis of data from the 2002 European Social Survey, Semyonov,
Gorodzeisky, and Glikman (2012) found that perceived
neighborhood safety was lower among Europeans who live
in neighborhoods with high proportions of ethnic minorities
and immigrants relative to those living in predominately
European neighborhoods.
On the basis of the extant research concerning the media’s
influence on public fear as well as the demonstrated associations between terrorist events, fear of crime, and attitudes
toward immigrants, we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 7: Concern about terrorism will predict support for anti-Muslim policies.
Although we hypothesize that concern, whether about
crime or terrorism, promotes anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim
views more specifically, additional factors may influence
support for anti-Muslim policies. In a review of the literature
on public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, for
example, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) noted consistent
associations between conservativism and anti-immigrant
attitudes as well as increases in prejudice toward immigrants
when religious interests are threatened (also see Ogan et al.
2014). The association between Christian religiosity and
anti-immigrant attitudes was also observed by Ciftci (2012),
in which an analysis of data from 15 nations showed that
expressing a Christian religious identity was positively associated with views of Muslims as violent and fanatical. In
addition, analyses of data from 11 European countries found
that Catholics and Protestants reported greater prejudice
against ethnic minorities relative to nonreligious people as
well as a positive association between church attendance and
prejudice against ethnic minorities (Scheepers, Gijsberts,
and Hello 2002). Furthermore, women have been shown to
express less anti-Muslim prejudice than men, while older
individuals tend to report more prejudiced attitudes toward
Muslims (Ciftci 2012; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). Therefore,
we examine the possible associations among conservativism,
Christian religiosity, and other predictors of terrorism-related
concern (gender and age) and support for anti-Muslim policy
measures.

Methods
Sample
After we designed the questionnaire, we commissioned
YouGov America to conduct a national survey of 1,000
respondents in July 2018. YouGov undertakes an array of
polls: marketing, political, and current affairs. It uses a panel
of more than 2 million American adults (6 million worldwide) who have “opted in” or agreed to complete online surveys in return for earning points toward vouchers for “big

brand” gift cards, such as Amazon, Macy’s, Old Navy, and
Walmart (YouGov 2018c). All respondents in the panel complete a “basic battery of questions—socio and political profile items when they join the panel,” which are updated
regularly and are known as the “core profile items” (YouGov
2018a, p.1). These are made available when the survey data
are transmitted in an SPSS file to the “customer.” These data
can be viewed in weighted and unweighted form. To increase
the representativeness of the sample, we used the weighted
data in our analyses.1
Opt-in Internet surveys are now a standard method in
research on public opinion across disciplines, ranging from
medicine and public health to psychology and sociology (for
a review of this methodology, see Thielo 2017). Although
selection biases cannot be ruled out fully, the results from
these surveys mirror, and at times outperform (e.g., in polls
on elections), public opinion studies using national probability samples that have their own methodological challenges
(e.g., nonresponse). They also have more generalizability
than state or local opinion polls. Notably, articles using data
from the YouGov panel have appeared in first-tier journals
such as the American Sociological Review, the American
Journal of Political Science, and Public Opinion Quarterly
(see, e.g., Ennis and Ramirez 2018; Schachter 2016).
Table 1 reports the characteristics of our sample. As
shown, approximately half of the sample is female, the average age is approximately 48 years, and about 33 percent are
conservative.

1YouGov

uses a sophisticated matching approach when choosing whom to invite and then include in any given survey. YouGov
(2018b, p.1) describes the methodology used in the current study
as follows: “YouGov interviewed 1102 respondents who were then
matched down to a sample of 1000 to produce the final dataset.
The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age,
race, education, party identification, ideology, Census region, and
political interest. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling
from the full 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) sample
with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file). Data on
voter registration status and turnout were matched to this frame
using the November 2010 Current Population Survey. Data on
interest in politics and party identification were then matched to this
frame from the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey. The matched cases
were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The
matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score
function included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education,
non identification with a major party, Census region, voter registration, and ideology. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles
of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified
according to these deciles. The subset of voters in the 2016 election was then post-stratified to match the 2016 election results, and
the total sample was post-stratified to match the frame on the full
stratification of four category race, four category age, gender, and
four category education.”
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics (n = 980).
Variable
Dependent variables
Fear of a terrorist attack
Level of worry about terrorism
Control variables
Race (white = 1)
Education
Full-time employment
Structural vulnerability
Gender (female = 1)
Age
Cultural orientation
Christian religiosity
Emotional vulnerability
CES-D score
Political partisanship
Conservative
Instrumental model
News Interest

Percentage

Range

Mean

SD

1–4
1–3

2.45
1.77

1.03
.74

1–6

3.26

1.58

18–90

47.40

18.16

0–4

2.68

1.29

10–40

18.20

6.09

1–4

3.10

1.05

64.20
58.48
51.41

32.70

Note: CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale.

Dependent Variables
We examine two separate dependent variables that assess
concern about terrorism. First, fear of terrorism assesses
the emotional response to terrorism threat. The respondents were asked, “How afraid are you of the following
events?” and presented with a list of eight events: a terrorist attack, economic or financial collapse, a natural disaster, a nuclear weapons attack, a pandemic or a major
epidemic, Whites no longer being the majority in the
United States, and widespread civil unrest. In essence,
respondents were asked about how fearful they are about
harmful events in society more generally. The response
scale ranged from 1 (“not afraid”) to 4 (“very afraid”). We
present descriptive statistics on responses to each event
and use the responses to fear of a terrorist attack in the
multivariate analyses.
Second, we assess personal worry about terrorism. As
an indicator of concern about risk, our measure of worry
about terrorism asks respondents about problems they
worry about in their personal, day-to-day lives. More specifically, the respondents were asked, “How much, if at all,
do you worry about the following things happening to
you?” The list included being the victim of a terrorist
attack, a mass shooting at some event or at work or school,
being the victim of a violent crime, having a personal
health crisis, someone breaking into your house when you
are home, losing your job, a hurricane, tornado, or some
natural disaster hitting your home, experiencing police
brutality, being the victim of a racial or hate crime, and
being in a serious car accident. The responses included 1

(“do not worry at all”), 2 (“worry a little”), and 3 (“worry
a lot”). Again, we present descriptive statistics on responses
to each concern and use the responses to worry about being
a victim of a terrorist attack in the multivariate analyses.
Note that in the sample, fear and worry about terrorism are
correlated at r = .68. This finding suggests that although
those who reported fear of terrorism are also likely to
worry about it, this was not the case for all respondents.
We also examine support for restrictive anti-Muslim
policies. The respondents rated the extent to which they
agreed with three statements: (1) “Strict border control policies are necessary to protect us from threats such as Islamic
extremism and terrorism,” (2) “America should cease all
immigration from Muslim countries,” and (3) “Muslims
living in the U.S. should be subject to more scrutiny than
people in other religious groups.” Agreement was indicated
on a scale of 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 4 (“strongly agree”).
We combined these items into a summed scale with higher
values indicating more support for anti-Muslim policies.
Cronbach’s α value for anti-Muslim policy support is
0.916.

Independent Variables
Structural Vulnerability. The structural vulnerability model
includes gender measured with a dichotomous variable. Selfidentified women were coded 1 and men were coded 0. Age
is measured in years.
Cultural Orientation. Christian religiosity is measured by
Christian respondents’ rating of the importance of religion on
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Figure 1. Structural equation modeling for concerns about terrorism.
Note: CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale.

a scale from 0 (“not at all important”) to 4 (“very important”). Non-Christian respondents received a code of 0 on the
Christian religiosity measure.2
Emotional Vulnerability. Emotional vulnerability is measured
using the shortened form of the Center for Epidemiologic
Studies Depression Scale (CES-D), a 10-item measure that
asks respondents to indicate the frequency of a series of feelings on a scale of 1 (“rarely or none of the time”) to 4 (“most
or all of the time”) (Björgvinsson et al. 2013). The CES-D
was originally developed by Radloff (1977) and is commonly used in studies of depression and psychological distress. Cronbach’s α value for the CES-D is 0.836.
Political Ideology. A scale of 1 (“very liberal”) to 5 (“very conservative”) was used to assess conservative ideology. Consistent with previous research, these measures were
dichotomized to prevent a loss of cases because of missing
data (or for those who answered “not sure”) (Haner et al.
2019; King and Wheelock 2007). Thus, respondents who
indicated that they were “conservative” or “very conservative” were coded 1, and all others were coded 0.
Instrumental Factor. News interest is measured by the extent
to which respondents follow political news, from 1 (“hardly
at all”) to 4 (“most of the time”).
2We

examined the issue of religiosity in a number of ways. In a separate analyses (not reported), we ran our models with non-Christians
excluded and found the same results reported in the tables. We also
created a measure of born-again Christian identity and found associations similar to those between Christian religiosity and the dependent measures. The limited number of non-Christian respondents
in the sample prevents us from a more specific subgroup analysis.
However, bivariate analyses indicated only Muslims and agnostic
participants showed no significant association between strength of
religiosity and anti-Muslim policy support.

Control Variables. Race is measured dichotomously with 1 =
White and 0 = non-White, education is measured ordinally
from 1 = no high school to 6 = postgraduate degree, and fulltime employment is measured dichotomously with 1 = yes
and 0 = no.

Analytic Strategy
After presenting descriptive statistics for our sample,
including central tendency and dispersion for all variables,
we present the frequencies of fear and worry for each
major event included in the survey. We then test hypotheses 1 through 6 using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis with level of fear and level of worry as the
dependent variables.3 We examined the independent variables for multicollinearity, which was not a concern, as
none shared a correlation above 0.40, and the variance
inflation factors across the regression models ranged
between 1.01 and 1.87.
Next, to examine whether concern about terrorism translates into support for anti-Muslim policy (hypothesis 7), we
used structural equation modeling in Stata 15. The structural
model shown in Figure 1 predicts support for anti-Muslim
policy as a latent construct measured by the three indicators
described above. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed the
measurement model to be a good fit, with standardized factor
loadings above 0.77 for all items and statistically significant at
the .001 level. In the structural models, we test the influence of
both terrorism fear and worry on anti-Muslim policy support,
with the significant structural, cultural, emotional, political,
and instrumental predictors of fear as predictors of both fear
and worry and support for anti-Muslim policy directly.
3We also ran ordinal logistic regression analyses, and the results did
not differ substantively from those reported in Table 5.
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Table 2. Sample Distribution of Fear of Major Events by Event Type (Percentages Reported; n = 973).
Fear of Major Events
Major Events
Widespread civil unrest
Terrorist attack
Economic/financial collapse
Natural disaster (earthquake, hurricane, tornado, flood,
blizzard/winter storm, drought)
Nuclear weapons attack
Pandemic or a major epidemic
Illegal immigration
Whites no longer being the majority in the United States

Not Afraid

Slightly Afraid

Afraid

Very Afraid

Total, Afraid or
Very Afraid

17.0
20.2
23.7
24.3

35.5
34.9
32.9
35.7

29.2
24.6
29.7
24.2

18.3
20.3
13.6
15.8

47.5
44.9
43.3
40.0

26.4
24.1
46.4
67.1

34.0
38.4
16.4
11.4

19.0
26.3
18.1
10.8

20.6
11.2
19.1
10.7

39.6
37.5
37.2
21.5

Table 3. Sample Distribution of Level of Worry by Event Type (Percentages Reported; n = 974).
Level of Worry
Type of Event
Having a personal health crisis
A mass shooting at some event or at work/school
Being the victim of a violent crime
Being in a serious car accident
Someone breaking into your house when you are home
Being the victim of a terrorist attack
Being a victim of a racial/hate crime
Losing your job
A hurricane, tornado, or some natural disaster hitting your home
Experiencing police brutality

Results
Extent of Concerns about Terrorism and Support
for Anti-Muslim Policies
We begin our analysis by examining how terrorism-related
fear and worry compare with fear and worry about other
major events or concerns. Table 2 presents the sample distribution of fear of major events by event type. Overall, the
results indicate that about 45 percent of the sample is “afraid”
or “very afraid” of a terrorist attack. Placed in context, fear of
a terrorist attack was the second greatest fear expressed by
respondents, outranked only by widespread civil unrest.
Americans appear to fear terrorism more than many other
potentially harmful events, including economic or financial
collapse (43.3 percent), natural disasters (40 percent), nuclear
weapons attack (39.6 percent), pandemic or major epidemic
(37.5 percent), illegal immigration (37.2 percent), and
Whites no longer being the majority (21.5 percent).
Table 3 shows the sample distribution of level of worry by
event type. These descriptive statistics suggest that almost
one in five respondents (18.7 percent) worry a lot and nearly
three in five (58.4 percent) worry at least a little or a lot about

Do Not Worry at All

Worry a Little

Worry a Lot

15.4
26.7
26.4
24.7
34.6
41.5
55.0
55.8
36.1
62.9

49.0
43.3
48.6
50.7
41.6
39.7
27.6
27.4
47.2
24.1

35.6
30.0
25.0
24.6
23.6
18.7
17.3
16.7
16.7
13.0

being the victim of a terrorist attack. However, unlike fear of
a terrorist attack, worry about being the victim of a terrorist
attack was outranked by several other harmful events, including having a personal health crisis (35.6 percent), a mass
shooting at some event or at work or school (30.0 percent),
being the victim of a violent crime (25.0 percent), being in a
serious car accident (24.6 percent), and someone breaking
into your house when you are at home (23.6 percent). The
data do indicate that Americans appear to worry about being
the victim of a terrorist attack more than some events, including being the victim of a racial crime (17.3 percent), losing
your job (16.7 percent), a hurricane, tornado, or some natural
disaster hitting your home (16.7 percent), or experiencing
police brutality (13.0 percent).4 The comparison of Tables 2
and 3 suggests that in general, a large proportion of Americans
experience fear as an emotional response to the threat of a
terrorist attack but are less personally concerned about being
a victim of an attack relative to other types of harmful events.
4Additional

analyses (available upon request) show that both
African Americans and Hispanics report significantly greater worry
about experiencing police brutality compared with Whites.
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Table 4. Sample Distribution of Support for Anti-Muslim Policies (Percentages Reported; n = 946).
Support for Anti-Muslim Policies
Anti-Muslim Policies
Strict border control policies are necessary to protect us from
threats such as Islamic extremism and terrorism
America should cease all immigration from Muslim countries
Muslims living in the U.S. should be subject to more scrutiny
than people in other religious groups

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Total, Strongly
Agree or Agree

17

23

31

30

61

32
30

33
35

18
21

17
12

35
33

Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Predicting Fear and Worry of Terrorism (n = 965).
Fear
Variables
Structural vulnerability
Female
Age
Cultural orientation
Christian religiosity
Emotional vulnerability
CES-D
Political ideology
Conservative
Instrumental model
News interest
Control variables
White
Education
Full-time employment
R2

Worry
β

b (SE)

β

b (SE)

.181 (.065)**
.000 (.002)

.088
−.005

.181 (.046)***
−.003 (.001)*

.122
−.081

.139 (.027)***

.174

.070 (.019)***

.123

.011 (.003)***

.121

.010 (.002)***

.151

.367 (.074)***

.168

.134 (.052)*

.085

−.075 (.035)*

−.076

−.089 (.025)***

−.126

−.233 (.070)**
−.065 (.022)**
.111 (.071)

−.109
−.100
.053

−.238 (.049)***
−.023 (.015)
−.047 (.050)

−.154
−.050
−.031

.136

.158

Note: b = unstandardized coefficient, β = standardized coefficient; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Next, we examine the level of support for anti-Muslim
policies. As shown in Table 4, between 33 percent and 61
percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree with policy-related statements that target Muslims as a feared group.
More specifically, about 6 in 10 of sample members favor
stricter border security policies, and about 1 in 3 subjects
endorse discriminatory policies, including banning immigration from Muslim countries and subjecting Muslims to more
scrutiny than other groups. These findings suggest two conclusions. First, a majority of Americans do not want to ban or
discriminate against Muslims, but they do want enhanced
security at the border so that terrorists can be weeded out.
Second, about one third of Americans clearly harbor antiMuslim views and favor their differential treatment.

Sources of Terrorism Concerns
We turn next to the OLS regressions of terrorism-related fear
and worry on the structural vulnerability, cultural orientation,
emotional vulnerability, political ideology, and instrumental

factors, which are presented in Table 5. As shown, of the
structural vulnerability factors, gender is a significant predictor of both fear of terrorism and worry about personal victimization from terrorism (β = 0.088 and β = 0.122, respectively).
In both models, women report greater fear and worry concerning terrorism than men, which is expected given the fear
of crime literature. These findings offer consistent support for
hypothesis 1. Age, however, is negatively associated with
worry about being a victim of a terrorist attack (β = −0.081).
This finding is counter to the fear of crime literature as well as
hypothesis 2. It may be possible that older Americans feel less
exposed to areas or activities that may become targets of terrorist attacks.
As expected in hypothesis 3, strength of Christian religiosity is positively associated with both fear and worry about
terrorism (β = 0.174 and β = 0.123, respectively). The results
also offer support for the emotional vulnerability model
(hypothesis 4), with a positive association between psychological distress and terrorism-related fear and worry (β =
0.121 and β = 0.151, respectively). In addition, conservatives,
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Table 6. Structural Equation Modeling Coefficients for Fear of a Terrorist Attack and Anti-Muslim Policy Support (n = 965).
Fear
Variables
Fear of a terrorist attack
Structural vulnerability
Female
Age
Cultural orientation
Christian religiosity
Emotional vulnerability
CES-D
Political ideology
Conservative
Instrumental model
News interest
Control variables
White
Education
Full-time
R2

Anti-Muslim Policy Support

b (SE)

β

—

—

.249 (.023)***

.307

.231 (.066)***
.000 (.002)

.113
−.005

−.189 (.045)***
.004 (.001)**

−.114
.094

.120 (.027)***

.152

.062 (.018)**

.097

.101 (.072)

−.075

.390 (.074)***

.180

β

b (SE)

—

—

.736 (.055)***

.418

−.076 (.035)*

−.077

−.075 (.024)**

−.093

−.215 (.072)**
−.079 (.022)**
.061 (.071)

−.097
−.118
.029

.080 (.049)
−.091 (.015)***
−.105 (.049)*

.044
−.167
−.061

.156

.483

Note: χ2 = 517.69, root mean square error of approximation = .048, confirmatory fit index = .952. b = unstandardized coefficient; β = standardized
coefficient; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

compared with those who do not identify as conservative,
report greater fear of terrorism (β = 0.168) and greater worry
about being a victim of a terrorist attack (β = 0.085). This
finding offers some support for hypothesis 5. Finally, news
interest is a significant negative predictor of both fear and
worry about terrorism (β = −0.076 and β = −0.126, respectively). This finding is the opposite of the relationship we predicted in hypothesis 6. We expected that greater media
exposure to terrorism-related news would lead to greater fear
of terrorism. Upon further consideration, it may be likely that
our news interest variable, the extent to which respondents
follow political news, is not specific enough to tap exposure
to terrorism-related news. Instead, this measure may capture
political awareness in general.
In sum, we find that women, persons who place a greater
importance on Christian religion, conservatives, and persons reporting greater psychological distress are more
fearful of terrorism and more worried about being a victim
of a terrorist attack than men, those who are less religious,
and those with lower levels of psychological distress. In
contrast, individuals who pay greater attention to political
news report less terrorism-related fear and worry. Among
the control variables, White individuals report less fear
and worry about terrorism than non-White individuals and
education is negatively associated with fear of terrorism.
The models shown in Table 5 explain approximately 14
percent of the variation in fear of terrorism and approximately 16 percent of the variation in personal worry about
terrorism.

Impact of Concern about Terrorism
The next step in our analysis is to determine whether terrorism-related fear and worry translates into policies that target
Muslims as an out-group. As noted above, results from confirmatory factor analysis suggested that the three indicators
of anti-Muslim policy support form a good measure. Building
on the measurement model, we use structural equation modeling to analyze the connections among terrorism-related
fear and worry, their significant predictors, and policy support. As shown in Figure 1, on the basis of the results of the
OLS regression, fear or worry is predicted by eight observed
variables: gender, age, Christian religiosity, conservative,
news interest, race, education, and full-time employment, as
well as the latent variable of psychological distress. With the
exception of psychological distress, these variables are also
modeled as predictors of anti-Muslim policy support (see
Saleem et al. 2015). Theoretically, we may expect these
structural, cultural, political, and instrumental factors to be
associated with policy support; however, we do not have reason to expect that psychological distress will predict policy
support. Fear and worry about terrorism are also, separately,
included as predictors of anti-Muslim policy support. The
unstandardized and standardized structural equation modeling coefficients for these models are presented in Tables 6
and 7. The model fit statistics suggest that both models fit the
data well (root mean square error of approximation = 0.048,
confirmatory fit index = 0.952 for both fear and worry).
As anticipated given the OLS results, gender, Christian
religiosity, conservativism, news interest, race, and education
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Table 7. Structural Equation Modeling Coefficients for Worry about a Terrorist Attack and Anti-Muslim Policy Support (n = 965).
Worry
Variables
Worry about a terrorist attack
Structural vulnerability
Female
Age
Cultural orientation
Christian religiosity
Emotional vulnerability
CES-D
Political ideology
Conservative
Instrumental model
News interest
Control variables
White
Education
Full-time
R2

Anti-Muslim Policy Support

b (SE)

β

β

—

—

.290 (.032)***

.255

.212 (.046)***
−.002 (.001)

.213
−.069

−.186 (.046)***
.005 (.001)***

−.113
.109

.039 (.018)*

.070

.077 (.018)***

.120

.171 (.065)**

.148

.180 (.051)***

.117

b (SE)

—

—

.793 (.056)***

.452

−.079 (.024)**

−.113

−.074 (.024)**

−.090

−.284 (.050)***
−.032 (.015)*
−.054 (.049)
.176

−.181
−.069
−.036

.109 (.050)*
−.099 (.015)***
−.071 (.049)
.457

.061
−.183
−.042

Note: χ2 = 521.46, root mean square error of approximation = .049, confirmatory fit index = .952. b = unstandardized coefficient; β = standardized
coefficient; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

are significant predictors of fear of terrorism in the expected
directions. Table 6 shows that these indicators also predict
anti-Muslim policy support. More specifically, women, persons employed full-time, persons with higher levels of education, and those who follow political news report less support
for such policies, whereas policy support is greater among
older persons, Whites, and those who report greater Christian
religiosity. In support of hypothesis 7, fear of terrorism significantly predicts support for policies targeted toward
Muslims. Indeed, as indicated by the standardized coefficients, after conservativism (β = 0.418), fear of terrorism is
the strongest predictor of support for terrorism-related policies that specifically target Muslims (β = 0.307). Our model
also reveals significant indirect effects of race, gender, education, religiosity, news interest and conservativism on policy
support through fear of terrorism.5
Table 7 reports the unstandardized and standardized coefficients from the structural model presented in Figure 1 with
worry about being a victim of a terrorist attack in place of fear
of terrorism. Overall, we see substantively the same findings as
those in the model with fear of terrorism. Worry about being the
victim of a terrorist attack significantly predicts support for antiMuslim policies (β = .255). Unlike the fear model, however, we
5The

standardized coefficients for the statistically significant indirect effects on anti-Muslim policy support through fear of terrorism
for the analysis in Table 6 are as follows: race, β = −0.023; gender, β
= 0.033; education, β = −0.037; religiosity, β = 0.062; news interest,
β = −0.023; and conservative, β = 0.047.

also see that psychological distress has a significant indirect on
policy support through personal worry (β = 0.037).6

Discussion
Terrorist attacks domestically and abroad have received
increasing levels of attention because of the often devastating
nature of these events. When attacks are “successful,” human
lives are lost, buildings are destroyed, and spaces once considered safe are deemed hazardous. Thus, the physical and emotional human cost is palpable. Although these incidents are
recognized as harmful, limited information is available on
how Americans view these attacks and how these perceptions
influence support for policies developed to prevent such
events, albeit often with limited evidence for their effectiveness. In this way, the present study placed concern about terrorism in context and tested predictors of terrorism-related
fear and worry as well as the connection between emotional
responses to terrorism and policy support using data from a
national sample of U.S. adults. Given the portrayal of Muslims
as terrorists in the United States (e.g., Das et al. 2009; Kishi
2017; Nellis and Savage 2012; Powell 2018), we focused on
anti-Muslim policies specifically.
6For the analysis in Table 7, the standardized coefficients for the
statistically significant indirect effects on policy support through
personal worry are as follows: race, β = −0.039; gender, β = 0.034;
education, β = −0.017; religiosity, β = 0.035; age, β = −0.018; news
interest, β = −0.028; conservative, β = 0.023; and psychological
distress, β = 0.037.
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Level and Sources of Public Concern
Our findings suggest that there are segments of the American
public that do express fear and worry about terrorism. The
results on the absolute level of fear of a terrorist attack indicate that almost half of the American public is “afraid” or
“very afraid” of the possibility of a terrorist attack.
Additionally, nearly one in five Americans indicated that
they were worried about being a victim of a terrorist attack.
In this way, fear of and worry about terrorism do not necessarily constitute an “American nightmare,” but it would be
inappropriate to dismiss these concerns as a myth. Although
the prevalence of these fears should not be overestimated,
they do exist in the American public, and as we will see, they
appear to be consequential.
Many of the variables derived from the extant empirical
and theoretical literature consistently predicted variation in
fear and worry. In particular, being female, expressing
Christian religiosity, and being non-White increased the likelihood of reporting fear or worry about a terrorist attack. As
hypothesized, it is likely that women are more fearful in general and that this fear extends to terrorist attacks. Additionally,
highly religious Christians could be concerned about outsiders or “others” who try to work against them thus increasing
their fear and worry. Although no hypotheses were specified
for race, non-White individuals were significantly more
likely to experience fear and worry compared with White
respondents. It is possible that non-White individuals have
greater fear and worry because the publicity of a terrorist
attack could highlight certain populations, such as non-White
individuals, as being risky. However, more research is needed
to explore the relationship between race, fear, and worry
about terrorism.
Another relevant finding is that those who reported being
more depressed or distressed were more fearful of and worried more about terrorism. This suggests that emotional vulnerability may have a general effect of making individuals
concerned by a range of risks in their lives. Again, the importance of scholars examining emotions is accentuated by this
possibility.
We also found that interest in political news was negatively associated with both fear and worry; this finding was
counter to our expectations. Although, as noted, our measure
is not specific to exposure to terrorism-related news, this
finding suggests that the news media in general may not have
consistent fear-arousing effects on Americans. Rather, it is
possible that greater interest in political news indicates more
awareness of current issues and a decreased likelihood of
emotional responses to terrorism.
Finally, some variables included in the models were
unique to fear and worry and illustrate discrepancies in influential factors. Thus, fear and worry could be tapping into different dimensions of concern related to terrorism. In
particular, individuals who were less educated were more
likely to be fearful of a terrorist attack but were not more
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worried about being a victim of an attack. In addition, age
was negatively associated with personal worry about a terrorist attack but was not associated with fear of terrorism.
Individuals who were older were less likely to worry about
attacks, which contradicts our hypothesis that older individuals were more vulnerable and likely more afraid. Given the
relative infrequency of terrorist attacks in the United States,
older individuals could have more experience supporting that
these are relatively rare events thus making them less worrisome. The relationships among fear, worry, education, and
age should be examined in future research to fully unpack
these dynamics.

Policy Implications
In general, the data on public opinion show that most
Americans want stricter boarder control measures to protect
the nation from extremism and terrorism. They also suggest
that a substantial minority of the Americans (between 30 percent and 40 percent) agree with policy measures that would
be harmful to Muslims. These include embracing discrimination by banning immigrants from Muslim countries and,
while in the United States, placing Muslims under greater
scrutiny than those of other religions. Some solace can be
drawn from the fact that about two thirds of Americans reject
these practices, likely seeing them as un-American. Still, a
good portion of the nation’s citizenry believes that such discrimination is legitimate.
Given the existence of this anti-Muslim sentiment, we
sought to determine the extent to which emotions underlie
support for such policies. Our analyses revealed that how
concerned people are about terrorist attacks can influence
whether they support anti-Muslim policies. In other words,
feelings about terrorism have real-world policy implications.
Notably, the strongest predictor in the model was holding a
conservative political ideology. It is difficult to know if this
association was heightened by Donald Trump’s use of antiMuslim rhetoric during his presidential campaign, but this
possibility is likely (Best 2018). Part of being a Trump loyalist now might entail being anti-immigrant, whether that
means banning immigrants from Mexico using a wall or
from Muslim countries through airport security.
Next to conservativism, however, fear and worry about
terrorism were the most influential predictors of anti-Muslim policy support. This finding suggests that not only political ideology but also emotions matter. Thus, policies such
as the Muslim ban are likely to hold special appeal for those
who are conservative and for those who fear and worry
about terrorism. Consistent with arguments in the culture of
fear literature, these beliefs and emotions may be inviting
targets for exploitation by President Trump and other rightwing, nationalist politicians (e.g., Altheide 2017; Saleem
et al. 2015; von Sikorski et al. 2017). In contrast, elected
officials who ignore this emotional infrastructure and seek
to persuade voters only by rational argumentation may be
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ineffective in reaching a large slice of the voters. More generally, these results suggest that especially in policy areas
marked by racial/ethnic resentment, future research should
examine the impact of a range of emotions (e.g., concern,
anger, hatred) on public policy preferences (more broadly,
see, e.g., Benson and Sams 2012; Nagin 2007).
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